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Executive summary 
Ambitious, innovative startups that scale are recognised as key sources of 
employment, productivity growth and innovation for Europe. However, evidence 
suggests that many startups struggle to go from starting to scaling, resulting in a 
‘scaleup’ gap in Europe. Moreover, while the long-term impact of the COVID-19 crisis 
on startups remains to be seen, many currently face greater constraints than before. 
At the same time, countries everywhere are likely facing a very deep recession, in 
which they will need every tool at their disposal to drive employment and economic 
growth. Continued policy support therefore is crucial.
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We find that European high growth startups: 
1. Are new-to-the-world innovators. Most European high growth startups report that the 
most innovative aspect of their business is a new-to-the-world innovation and many 
adopt innovative technologies (e.g. big data, artificial intelligence) in parts of their 
business.
2. Hold the promise of high skilled job creation and growth. Before COVID-19, a large 
share of high growth startups expected to increase the demand for high skilled workers 
and prioritised growth over short term profits.
3. Are hindered by the availability of finance. Already before COVID-19, the availability of 
finance was a major barrier for many high growth startups. In addition, our data reveals 
that, compared to US startups, European startups attract 54 per cent less private funding 
nine years after foundation. European high growth startups are also disproportionately 
hindered by a lack of staff with suitable skills and attitudes.
4. Seemingly benefit from public startup grants/investment. High growth startups are 
more likely than other startups to make use of more than one form of public support and 
particularly seem to benefit from startup grants/investments.
In times when there is enormous pressure on startups with high growth potential, we 
highlight some ways in which governments can continue to support them:
1. Encourage corporate-startup collaboration to boost private investments, e.g. by 
creating novel platforms for startups to collaborate with corporates and other partners.
2. Expand governments’ toolbox to engage with startups through innovative procurement 
and co-development, e.g. by experimenting with new models of startup engagement. 
3. Promote early enterprise education to improve the availability of suitable staff, e.g. 
by building on the Entrepreneurship Competence Framework to design and evaluate 
enterprise education initiatives. 
This report investigates factors that influence startup growth, by identifying some 
unique features of high growth startups in Europe. While the data for this report 
was collected prior to the COVID-19 crisis, the findings underscore the role of high 
growth startups for innovation ecosystems in Europe. We also highlight some ways 
governments can continue to support startups by encouraging collaborations with 
startups as an active innovation partner. 
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Introduction
Startups, especially those that achieve high growth, are important sources of innovation 
and job creation.1 For these reasons, European policy makers work hard to create effective 
ecosystems where innovative startups can thrive and scale. Continued policy support 
for high growth startups is crucial: while the long-term impact of the COVID-19 crisis on 
startups remains to be seen, many currently face greater constraints than before, whilst 
economies across the globe will likely need innovation and economic growth more than 
ever in the coming months. 
Despite ongoing efforts to build startup-friendly ecosystems, Europe continues to suffer from 
a ‘scaleup’ gap: only 0.5 percent of European startups are estimated to scale.2 There is also 
a persistent gap in startup activity between Europe and the United States (US): according to 
recent estimates, Europe lags behind the US in terms of startups by a factor of three.3 
This report aims to better understand the factors that may underlie these gaps. We ask:
 • What are the differences between European startups with and without high growth 
(referring to the former as ‘high growth startups’)? 
 • What are the differences between high growth startups in Europe and the US?
In recent years, important progress has been made to better grasp key features of 
European startups and scaleups, by improving data availability both at a European level, 
for example through the Tech Scaleup Europe annual reports and the European Startup 
Monitor4, 5, 6 and at national levels such as through the Annual Scaleup Reviews in the 
United Kingdom (UK).7, 8 However, there remain many gaps in our knowledge, such as a 
detailed understanding of the innovative activity of European startups, their growth and 
exit ambitions and the role of different types of public support. Moreover, due to a lack of 
comparable data, we know little about the differences between startups in Europe and in 
the US. 
Based on novel survey data from the European Investment Bank (EIB) collected from 
startups listed on Crunchbase in Europe (EU27 + UK) and the US, this report offers granular 
insights into each of these features. For the purposes of this report, we define high 
growth startups as those that experienced significant levels of turnover growth (for more 
information about the definitions and sample used in this report, see next section). 
While the data for this report was collected prior to the COVID-19 crisis, the findings 
underscore the role of high growth startups for innovation ecosystems in Europe – 
something which will be even more important in the coming months or years, as countries 
struggle to avert deep economic recessions or even depression. We find that startups in 
general, but especially those with high growth, are highly innovative. Compared to startups 
with lower growth, high growth startups are more likely to develop new-to-world innovations 
and to adopt innovative technologies within their business, indicating that innovation 
drives firm growth. High growth startups also hold the promise of economic growth and job 
creation. Before COVID-19, a large share of high growth startups expected to increase the 
demand for high skilled workers and aspired growth rather than short term profits.
From Starting to Scaling: How to foster startup growth in Europe
4
However, even before the pandemic hit, high growth startups indicated to be 
disproportionately hindered by the availability of finance. Importantly, public support 
seems to help: high growth startups were more likely than other startups to mention the use 
of more than one form of public support and particularly seemed to benefit from startup 
grants/investments. 
In contrast to common perception, US high growth startups are not more likely to report 
scaling as their main business ambition. However, compared to their US counterparts, 
European high growth startup owners differ in their exit openness: our data reveal that they 
were more likely to be opposed to exiting their business. Interestingly, compared to their US 
counterparts, European high growth startups are much more likely to use public support, but 
much less likely to attract private funding. They also report more barriers to the success of 
their business, especially when it comes to the availability of staff.
Based on these findings, we see room for three policy actions to support European startups 
in achieving their growth ambitions: 
1. Encourage corporate-startup collaboration to boost private investments.
2. Expand governments’ toolbox to engage with startups through innovative procurement 
and co-development. 
3. Promote early enterprise education to improve the availability of suitable staff. 
Methodology and data
This report uses novel data sources to improve our understanding of startups. We view 
startups as businesses that are looking to grow in terms of market access, revenues and 
number of employees, but are still in search of a repeatable and scalable business model.9 
In order to understand what may drive the higher growth rates of some startups, we 
specifically examine the subset of high growth startups. 
Typically, high growth firms are defined in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) definition as 'enterprises with average annual growth 
in employees or turnover greater than 20 per cent per annum over a three-year period, and 
with more than ten employees at the beginning of the period.'10 In recent years, the term 
scaleups has become more prevalent and is often used interchangeably with high growth 
firms. Other definitions have also emerged that factor in the amount of capital raised by 
companies to define them as scaleups.9
This report mirrors the OECD definition, but refers to ‘high growth startups’ rather than ‘high 
growth firms’ or scaleups to denote the report’s focus on startups as a specialised subset of 
the wider business population. Specifically, we define high growth startups as startups that 
experienced significant growth in terms of turnover. 
The main data sources used in this report are:
 • Crunchbase.
 • EIB’s Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019.
 • EIB Survey on Investment and Investment Finance (EIBIS) 2019.
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Crunchbase is a commercial database of innovative startups and the founders, employees 
and investors behind them, maintained by Crunchbase Inc. It is an online platform where 
young firms around the world can present their businesses and their current financing 
needs. The phenomenal growth of Crunchbase in recent years means that it now accounts 
for close to the entire universe of young firms with high growth ambitions (see EIB and 
OECD for more details). A big advantage of Crunchbase is that data is sourced from two 
main channels: first, a large network of global investment firms and second, executives, 
entrepreneurs, and investors who update and revise their Crunchbase profile. 
EIB Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019. The starting point of data collection for the EIB 
Start-up and Scale-up Survey is the Crunchbase database. 1,100 startups younger than 
ten years, which are registered either in the EU28 or the US were invited to participate in 
a 20-minute telephone interview (in the local language). Eligible respondents were chief 
executive officers, financial managers and heads of accounts. The fieldwork for the survey 
started in April 2019 and continued until July 2019. The main aim of the interview was to 
ask firms about their phase (startup or scaleup), business activities and what, in their view, 
went well in addition to what hampered their growth in recent years. This information gives 
a unique perspective on the success factors of young firms when it comes to realising their 
growth ambitions. Survey answers based on the EIB Start-ups and Scale-Ups survey 2019 in 
this report are aggregated using firm weights based on the Crunchbase Database. 
EIBIS is an EU-wide survey that gathers qualitative and quantitative information on 
investment activities by small businesses (5 to 250 employees) and large corporates, their 
financing requirements and the difficulties they face. The survey involves interviews with 
12,500 businesses in the EU and 800 businesses in the US. It is designed to be representative 
at the country level; and for most countries, the sector group level (manufacturing, services, 
construction and infrastructure) as well as firm size class level (micro, small, medium and 
large). Survey answers based on EIBIS 2019 are aggregated using firm weights that are 
based on value added.
In this report, we use the three data sets described above in order to differentiate between 
the following types of firms:
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are micro, small and medium firms employing 
fewer than 250 people. The definition does not take firms’ age into consideration. This 
group represents the largest share of all businesses in Europe and is very heterogeneous. 
Whenever numbers on SMEs are represented, we draw on data from EIBIS 2019, unless 
otherwise specified.
We define startups as young firms with high growth ambitions. They are a specialised 
subset of SMEs. The startups referred to in this report were listed on Crunchbase, were less 
than ten years old and were still active at the time of data collection (in 2018). 
Throughout the report, we define high growth startups as 'any startup that reported an 
average turnover growth of greater than 60 per cent over the last three years' in the EIB 
Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019. To guarantee the soundness of our definition, we did 
several robustness checks such as including employee and turnover thresholds, as well as 
examining higher turnover growth rates. All results presented are robust to alterations of the 
definition.
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Key finding 1
High growth startups are new-to-the-world 
innovators 
Startups, especially those that achieved high levels of growth, are typically innovators. 
Only 3 per cent of high growth startups (and only 5 per cent of other startups) report 
there is nothing new about their business (Figure 1). 'Product or service' innovation is 
the most prominent type of innovation activity, followed by process innovation (i.e. the 
delivery mode of products or services, or the organisation of the supply chain). 'Marketing' 
innovation is less common; a minority of startups report that their branding/advertising 
models or the way they generate revenue is the most innovative aspect of their business. 
Figure 1: The most innovative aspect of the business reported by high growth and other 
startups
High growth startups differentiate themselves as developers of innovations that are 
new to the world (Figure 2). Most high growth startups (65 per cent) report that the most 
innovative aspect of their business is a new-to-the-world innovation (compared to 58 
per cent of startups with lower growth). Compared to startups with lower growth, they 
are less likely to develop innovations that are new to the country or new to the local 
Baseline: all startups in EU27+UK. Source: EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019, firms sampled from 
Crunchbase. 
Most innovative aspect of the business
Share of startups (%)
High growth
startups
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
50 15 13 11 7 3
43 21 12 10 9 5Other startups
Products/services you sell Delivery mode Organisation of supply chain
Revenue generation Branding/advertisement Nothing new
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market. This is in stark contrast to new-to-the world innovation rates reported by SMEs in 
general, which are typically less than 15 per cent.11 These findings mirror previous research 
demonstrating that innovation is linked to firm growth.12, 13
Figure 2: The percentage of innovative high growth and other startups that develop  
new-to-the-world innovations
The highly innovative activity of high growth startups seems to be supported both by their 
business models and the innovative business practices they adopt. Compared to startups 
with lower growth levels, high growth startups seem to have a greater focus on intangible 
assets: they are more likely to develop intellectual property (40 vs. 31 per cent) and less 
likely to develop physical things (20 vs. 28 per cent). High growth startups are also more 
likely to be active in sectors that enable innovations to scale quickly, most notably the 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector (Figure 3). 
Baseline: all startups that stated an innovative aspect in EU27+UK. Source: EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 
2019, firms sampled from Crunchbase. 
New-to-the world innovators
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Figure 3: The share of high growth and other startups by sector
In addition, compared to other startups and SMEs in general, high growth startups are 
more likely to adopt innovative technologies. Specifically, 53 per cent of high growth 
startups implement cognitive technologies such as big data or artificial intelligence in 
(parts of) their business, compared to 40 per cent of other startups and only 11 per cent of 
SMEs. Given the widely debated impact of the adoption of such digital technologies on 
jobs, this raises the question: what is the impact of startups on labour demand?
Baseline: startups founded between 2008-2018 that are still active, present in EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 
2019 in EU27+UK. Source: Crunchbase, authors’ calculation. 
Sector
Share of startups (%)
High growth
startups










13 6 7 29Other startups
Manufacturing Biotech and healthcare Data and analytics Services
Energy and sustainability Multimedia and gaming Finance ICT
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Key finding 2
High growth startups contribute to high-skilled job 
creation, but have a strong gender imbalance 
Startups in the sample have a median of six employees (high growth startups have 
a median of nine employees). Looking ahead, startups, in particular high growth 
startups, expect to create more jobs by increasing the overall demand for workers in 
their market (Figure 4). This is in line with an established body of research showing the 
disproportionate role of young high growth firms in employment growth.1 
Figure 4: High growth and other startups’ expected net positive impact on the demand for 
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Net balance shows the difference between the share 
of firms expecting an increase and firms expecting a decrease
Baseline: all startups in EU27+UK. Source: EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019, firms sampled from 
Crunchbase. 
Startups' expected net positive impact on...
Demand for high-skilled workers
















Other startups High growth startups
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When asked about the expected impact of their business in the next three years, 
respondents expect a strong impact on the demand for high-skilled workers. Most high 
growth startups expect a net positive impact (63 per cent), slightly higher than startups 
without a high growth phase (58 per cent). Specifically, 70 per cent of high growth 
startups expect to increase the demand for high-skilled labour, 7 per cent expect to 
decrease the demand and 23 per cent expect no impact. 
When it comes to the demand for low-skilled labour, no substantial impact is expected 
by the respondents. Most high growth startups expect no impact on the demand for 
low-skilled labour (60 per cent), 18 per cent expect to increase it and 22 per cent expect 
to decrease it – cancelling out any substantial positive or negative potential impact. 
High growth startups are slightly more likely to expect a net negative impact, contrary to 
startups without a high growth phase (-4 per cent vs. 4 per cent). 
Although startups are considered to be important drivers of job creation, our findings 
suggest a strong gender imbalance in who occupies these jobs, particularly in high 
growth startups. Startups that were founded by women are strongly underrepresented: in 
only 10 per cent of high growth startups (compared with 16 per cent in other startups), half 
of the founders are women (or the sole founder is a woman). Moreover, in 73 per cent of 
high growth startups (compared to 66 per cent in other startups), fewer than half or none 
of the employees are women. 
Key finding 3
High growth startups are ambitious to scale, not 
focused on short-term profits or exits 
Startups are highly ambitious: the majority of startups report that their main ambition 
in the next three years is to scale (further) by growing turnover (Figure 5). The ambition 
to grow is correlated with achieved growth: startups that recently experienced a growth 
episode are more likely to have a strong growth ambition (62 per cent) compared to 
startups without a growth episode (55 per cent). Remarkably, only a minority (4 per cent) 
of high growth startups are strictly seeking to maximise short-term profits. Startups’ high 
growth ambition is in stark contrast with the general SME population, where typically only 
around one in four, or one in six, report a substantive ambition to grow.14, 15 
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Figure 5: The main ambition of high growth and other startups
Startups’ growth ambition is also reflected in their international outlook. More than half of 
startups are highly international, primarily operating within Europe (around 24 per cent) 
and beyond Europe (around 33 per cent). The remaining startups primarily operate in 
their home market. We find no clear differences between high growth startups and other 
startups. 
Although startups have strong growth ambitions, these do not necessarily translate into 
clear exit strategies. In fact, only 8 per cent of startups are looking for exit options in the 
next three years and this share is comparable for high growth startups and others. While 
high growth startups seem to be slightly more open to the idea of exiting, the majority of 
startup owners are either neutral (24 per cent) or even opposed to an exit (31 per cent), 
regardless of the startup’s growth levels. 
Baseline: all startups in EU27+UK. Source: EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019, firms sampled from Crunchbase. 
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Key finding 4
High growth startups are mostly hindered by the 
availability of staff and finance 
Figure 6: The percentage of SMEs, other startups and high growth startups that perceive 
the availability of staff and finance as a major barrier
Startups most frequently mention ‘lack of staff with the right skills’ as a major obstacle to 
the success of their business (Figure 6). This is potentially related to the gender imbalance 
discussed above. High growth startups are particularly constrained when it comes to the 
availability of staff: 34 per cent view it as a major barrier, significantly more than startups 
without high growth (21 per cent). Of those high growth startups that are hindered by 
the availability of staff, many struggle to recruit employees with the right technological 
skills (43 per cent). Others report that job candidates lack the attitude, motivation or 
personality (25 per cent) or the right qualifications or experience (20 per cent). A lack of 
knowledge of products and services is not a key recruitment challenge – only 5 per cent 
view it as a barrier. High growth startups seem to address the recruitment challenge by 
paying their employees for performance: compared to startups without a high growth 
episode, they are more likely to reward good performance with higher pay (55 per cent vs. 
67 percent). 



















Availability of staff Access to finance
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Baseline: All startups in EU27+UK. Source: EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019, firms sampled from 
Crunchbase. Respondents could select multiple options. 
Compared to startups, SMEs are even more likely to perceive a lack of staff with the right 
skills as a major obstacle. This might be linked to mechanisms by which past success of 
startups feeds current success, leading to agglomeration tendencies. The EIB finds that 
startup activities tend to happen primarily in relatively rich regions that attract young 
talent.3 In contrast, the typical SME is more likely to be located in less dynamic regions, 
making it more difficult to attract skilled staff.16
An equally important challenge for startups is the availability of external finance. Nearly 
one in three startups states that the availability of finance is a major obstacle to the 
success of their business. Startups with and without a growth episode are equally likely 
to report access to finance as a major obstacle (29 per cent of high growth startups vs. 
28 per cent of all other startups). However, SMEs are less likely to cite access to external 
finance as a major obstacle (18 per cent). This is related to the fact that startups tend to 
have significantly higher rates of investment per employee compared to a typical SME. 
They also tend to invest more in intangible assets compared to more mature companies. 
Startups therefore have a greater need for external finance, but at the same time a lower 
share of tangible assets that can serve as security for the finance.3 
Key finding 5
High growth startups seem to benefit from public 
startup investment/grants 
Figure 7: The use of public support by startups and high growth startups in the EU. 
Respondents could select multiple options
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Almost one in two startups has used at least one form of public support, such as grants, 
subsidised loans, publicly sponsored venture capital or access to a publicly subsidised 
hub or cluster. High growth startups are particularly likely to use multiple types of public 
support (Figure 7): 22 per cent have used two or more forms of public support (compared 
to 13 per cent of startups without a high growth phase). They seem to benefit most from 
startup investments or grants – 32 per cent of startups that experienced high growth 
received a startup investment or grant, compared to 21 per cent of startups without a 
high growth episode. This is in line with research carried out by the ScaleUp Institute in 
the UK, which showed that 642 scaleups supported by grants (worth £205m) from the 
government’s innovation agency, Innovate UK, were able to leverage a further £3bn from 
the private sector.17
The data suggests a correlation between public financial support and innovation and 
growth, although the underlying mechanism is unclear. On the one hand, innovative 
startups with growth potential could be more likely to attract public funding. This would 
indicate that public support providers are good at ‘picking winners’, effectively targeting 
and identifying highly innovative startups who are likely to grow, perhaps regardless 
of receiving public support. On the other hand, public financial support could be a 
fundamental lever for startups to innovate and grow that may otherwise not be able to, 
effectively addressing a funding gap. Interestingly, there are striking differences between 
Europe and the US when it comes to public funding (see Key Finding 6 for a more detailed 
discussion).
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Key finding 6
European high growth startups are more constrained 
than US startups in terms of access to private 
funding and talent 
Europe lags behind the US in terms of the number of startups by a factor of three, a recent 
EIB report shows.3 By contrasting the data on European versus US startups, we highlight 
three key factors that may contribute to this gap: a lack of private funding, difficulty in 
attracting talent and a lack of entrepreneurial recycling. 
Most notably, there is a private funding gap between Europe and the US. The EU is 
characterised by significantly lower levels of venture capital investment. As highlighted in 
Figure 8 below, the funding gap grows as startups get older. Nine years after foundation, a 
European startup has attracted around 54 per cent less funding compared to a US startup. 
Figure 8: Median funding per startup
European high growth startups are much more likely to use public support than their US 
counterparts (Figure 9), especially when it comes to accessing public clusters/hubs (16 vs. 7 
per cent) or using subsidised loans (16 vs. 3 per cent). In fact, 72 per cent of US high growth 
startups have not used public funding, compared to 51 per cent of European startups. 
Baseline: startups founded between 2008-2018 that are still active. Source: Crunchbase, authors’ calculation.
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This could be due to fundamental differences between the European and US ecosystem,18 
in terms of availability of public support. Interestingly, using startup grants/investment is 
correlated with higher growth in both the EU and the US: those who benefited from grants 
or investment are more likely to have experienced high growth.
Figure 9: The use of public support by high growth startups in the EU and US. Respondents 
could select multiple options
European high growth startups perceive more barriers that may undermine the success 
of their business compared to their US counterparts. Most notably, European startups are 
more likely to perceive the availability of staff (34 vs. 15 percent) as a major barrier. Given 
that access to talent is an oft-cited ingredient for startup success,19 the lack of staff could be 
a possible cause for lower startup activities in Europe. European startups may particularly 
struggle to recruit the right staff because they are less attractive employers compared to 
their US peers: they pay lower wages, are less likely to reward good performance and invest 
less in the training of their workforce.3 
Finally, European high growth startups are more opposed to exit than their US counterparts 
(Figure 10). This is not always a bad thing: in some cases, there is an overemphasis on 
exiting, causing startups to exit prematurely often due to investor pressures to cash out.20 
However, in other cases, there may be a missed opportunity for entrepreneurial recycling 
when the individuals involved could use their experience to further strengthen the European 
startup ecosystem, either by starting new ventures or by becoming business angels or 
mentors.21 A recent report by the EIB confirms that a major barrier to startup activities in 
Europe is a lack of past success. Past success plays an important role when it comes to 
fuelling exit markets for new generations of startups, whether it be as acquirers of startups 
or through their impact on stock market liquidity.3 
Baseline: all high growth startups. Source: EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019, firms sampled from Crunchbase. 
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Source: EIBIS Start-up and Scale-up Survey 2019, firms sampled from Crunchbase.
On the one hand, the relative exit opposition of European high growth startups could 
be driven by ‘demand-side’ factors, such as different preferences, little awareness of exit 
options or unwillingness to give up control over the business.22 On the other hand, it could 
also be ‘supply-based’: there may be a lack of desirable exit options, for example in the form 
of tailored procedures for startups to go public or a harmonised European stock market. 
Figure 10: The exit openness of high growth startups in the EU and US
Interestingly, attempts to explain the gap in startup activity between Europe and the US 
sometimes point to differences in startup or founder characteristics, for example in terms 
of growth ambition, founder experience or innovation rates, but we find no substantial 
differences. This indicates that the gap may be best explained by wider ecosystem-level 
differences. This means that policy makers play an important role in addressing the gap by 
designing effective ecosystems. 
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Policy priorities to support startups in scaling their 
innovations 
Based on novel EIB survey data on startups listed on Crunchbase, this report identifies 
unique characteristics of high growth startups to inform targeted policymaking. We find 
that startups, especially high growth ones, are key sources of innovation and job creation. 
However, European high growth startups are also disproportionately constrained compared 
to their US counterparts, in particular when it comes to the availability of private funding 
and a lack of staff with the right fit.
 These findings suggest that, in Europe, there seems to be a lot of scope for creating 
supportive ecosystems, enabling startups to scale their innovations. We highlight three ways 
in which policy makers could play an important role for enabling high growth startups.
1. Promote early enterprise education to improve the availability of   
 suitable staff
One in three high growth startups in our sample perceive the availability of staff as a major 
obstacle to the success of their business, in particular a lack of fit in terms of technological 
skills. In order to increase the attractiveness of startups as an employer, many prominent 
organisations including the European Startup Network and Allied for Startups have called 
for improved stock-option schemes that will incentivise top talent to work for startups 
in Europe. Policy makers are taking note and reform is now on the agenda of European 
countries such as France, Ireland, Germany and Finland.
Another policy option in response to these perceived barriers is to promote science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills in order to improve the pool of 
workers with the right skills. Currently, several initiatives exist. For example, the EU STEM 
Coalition, a network of national STEM platforms supported by the European Commission 
and national members, shapes education policies in order to promote STEM among 
students.23 Moreover, through the Digital Europe Programme, the European Commission 
made 700 million euros available for 2021-2027 to advance the digital skills of students and 
the existing workforce.24
The survey results also showed that one out of four high growth startups report that job 
candidates lack the attitude, motivation or personality for the role. The European Digital 
City Index25 shows that positive attitudes to entrepreneurship are associated with a higher 
level of entrepreneurship, while an entrepreneur’s mindset is recognized to boost business 
profitability and growth.26 In addition, developmental psychology research suggests 
that these attitudes and mindsets are best shaped during childhood and adolescence.27 
Therefore, we argue that enterprise education could play an important role in promoting 
the development of entrepreneurial skills and mindsets, and create a workforce that is fit for 
entrepreneurial environments. Shaping attitudes and mindsets through education could be 
crucial, not just to sustain the next generation of entrepreneurs, but to create a workforce 
that views entrepreneurship as desirable and can thrive in entrepreneurial settings – 
whether in a startup, SME or large corporate.
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However, despite being featured in the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan,28 there has 
not been a widespread uptake of early enterprise education initiatives in many European 
countries, especially during primary and secondary education. According to a 2016 
review of education and training entrepreneurship in Europe, 'very few countries include 
practical entrepreneurial experiences as a regular and compulsory part of the curriculum'.29 
Moreover, the review concluded that learning outcomes linked to enterprise education 
are often fragmented and do not progress between education levels. Since then, progress 
has been made to define such common learning outcomes through the development 
of the Entrepreneurship Competence Framework.30 While the framework has helped in 
promoting enterprise education and has sparked a range of individual organisations to 
adopt it,31 the framework has not been adopted widely in national education systems. As 
a result, most European countries (with the exception of the Netherlands) lag behind the 
United States in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor index of early enterprise education.32 
A more widespread adoption of early enterprise education programmes could benefit the 
development of entrepreneurial attitudes and skills. For example, in the UK, the ScaleUp 
Institute has endorsed practical programmes that expose children and young people to 
entrepreneurship, such as Founders4Schools.7 
Of course, the outlined policy suggestions above call for further evidence building to assess 
the impact of enterprise education programmes. Existing evidence reviews report promising 
benefits for individual students (e.g. higher employability), teaching institutions (e.g. greater 
teacher engagement), and society and the economy as a whole (e.g. more high-quality 
startups).33 However, current evidence predominantly concerns enterprise education at a 
university level, while only limited evidence exists about what programmes are available 
on a pre-university level and how they support the development of key entrepreneurial 
competencies in the long term. Researchers can build on the Entrepreneurship Competence 
Framework to design and evaluate enterprise education initiatives. Robust evidence may be 
developed through programmes such as the Innovation Growth Lab, a global initiative that 
promotes the use of experimental trials to develop and assess interventions that promote 
innovation and entrepreneurship.
2. De-risk corporate-startup collaboration to boost private investment
Almost one in two European startups in our sample uses at least one form of public financial 
support, compared to only one in four in the US. Such relatively high use is not necessarily 
a concern: we find that public financial support can be a boon for growth, especially in 
the form of startup grants/investment. Moreover, some evidence suggests a ‘crowding-in 
effect’, when the provision of public funding leads to higher levels of subsequent private 
funding,34 if public funding programmes are properly designed.35 Instead, we find that there 
is a private funding gap between Europe and the US, with the EU having significantly lower 
levels of venture capital investment. In addition, our results suggest that there is a particular 
deficiency in the later stages of firm development. There seems to be a lack of sufficient 
private funding in the European startup ecosystem, a finding also confirmed in literature.36
There are several ways in which European policy makers can address this gap. The 
European Commission announced a ten billion euro fund to support early-stage deeptech 
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companies, to be formally launched in 2021.37 The fund will be run by the European 
Innovation Council and will mostly provide grants, but it also aims to co-invest alongside 
private venture capital funds. While such initiatives to increase public funding are certainly 
welcome and can indirectly result in more private funding due to crowding-in effects, more 
action is needed to directly boost private investments.
A possible way to boost direct private investment is by promoting corporate-startup 
collaboration, a well-known mechanism for helping startups scale.38 Corporates can improve 
startups’ access to finance, markets and customers, thereby helping build strong startup 
ecosystems. Some evidence even suggests that corporate investment results in greater 
benefits for startups, compared to non-corporate investment. For example, startups can 
receive higher levels of investment from corporates than they would from non-corporate 
investors, because corporate investors may be willing to pay a ‘strategic premium’ for 
startups that are aligned with their goals.39 Moreover, when startups can leverage additional 
assets from their corporate investor, they exhibit higher degrees of innovation compared to 
startups backed by non-corporate investors.40
However, setting up meaningful corporate-startup collaborations requires overcoming 
various internal, relational and environmental barriers.41 Corporates may struggle to make 
funds available due to internal risk aversion or lack of an intrapreneurial culture. Key 
barriers for startups involve differences in speed (e.g. slow corporate decision-making) or 
coordination challenges (e.g. changing corporate contact points). 
Policy makers can support corporate-startup collaboration by minimising these barriers 
and de-risking the act of collaborating with highly innovative startups. One way to do so is 
to devise financial incentives for corporate-startup collaboration, for example through tax 
advantages for corporates that invest in startups. To also encourage smaller corporates or 
SMEs to work with startups, public funders can set up co-investment or loan schemes for 
startup collaboration.
Policy makers can also create novel European platforms for startups to collaborate with 
corporates and other partners. Typically, platforms are set up to facilitate strategic one-
to-one matchmaking between corporates and startups, such as the Scaleup Summits 
organised at European stock exchanges as part of the Startup Europe Partnership or the 
European Innovation Council Corporate Days. To better share the risks of working with 
highly innovative startups, especially those active in emerging technology markets, policy 
makers can set up broader collaboration platforms that involve multiple private partners 
(e.g. SMEs, corporates) and/or public partners (e.g. research organisations, regulators). 
These can take the form of public-private accelerators, test beds, living labs and sandboxes 
– all designed to de-risk and accelerate the development and adoption of emerging 
technologies.
More complex collaboration modes require more complex collaboration practices. We 
therefore recommend promoting best practices in corporate-startup collaboration. As 
part of the Startup Europe Partnership, many of these practices have been identified, for 
example for startup-friendly procurement or investment.41 Large corporates that adopt 
them have been acknowledged as 'Corporate Startup Stars', an annual ranking of large 
corporates that work well with startups.42 Such a ranking directs corporates’ collaboration 
practices, but also benefits startups by helping them identify good corporate partners. 
Expanding the evidence base of best – and worst – collaboration practices and making 
them transparent are key to further support and de-risk corporate-startup collaboration.
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3.  Expand governments’ toolbox to engage with startups through   
 innovative procurement and co-development
Another way for governments to tackle the private funding gap and to build stronger 
startup ecosystems is to take a more active role themselves. Governments typically act 
as conveners, funders and facilitators in the startup ecosystem, but only rarely engage 
directly with startups, for example through co-development or innovative procurement. 
Only a minority of startups and scaleups currently collaborate with, or sell into, the public 
sector. According to the European Startup Monitor 2019, only eight per cent of European 
startups consider public institutions their most important cooperating partner.4 Likewise, 
according to the Annual Scaleup Review by the ScaleUp Institute, only one in ten UK 
scaleups collaborates with governments.7
Yet, in working directly with startups, governments hold important levers for startup growth 
and government innovation. From the startup perspective, a government contract could 
make the difference between starting and scaling. For governments, engaging directly 
with innovative startups means access to new technologies, enabling the digitalisation and 
innovation of public services to ensure better outcomes for citizens. Direct government 
interactions with startups can also be an important innovation policy tool: through startup 
procurement or co-development, governments can trigger innovation more broadly, 
by catalysing the development of new technologies that have spillover effects in other 
sectors.43
However, current government processes are often not designed to facilitate innovation. 
Many barriers inhibit governments’ engagement with startups, including risk aversion,  
a lack of an internal innovation culture, and overly restrictive and complicated 
procedures.44, 45 Some of these barriers are deeply rooted and require a significant culture 
shift and change in the government’s mission, so that innovation becomes an essential 
part of the government’s practices and mindset.
We recommend that governments treat direct startup engagement as an innovation 
tool. One way to do so is to increase the levels of public procurement from startups by 
designing more startup-friendly public procurement processes. Public procurement has 
long been recognised as a potential driver of innovation.46 However, current procurement 
procedures often are not suitable to innovative startups and can even disadvantage 
them compared to established companies.45 Lessons learned from improving innovation 
in public procurement show that it requires adapted practices, compared to traditional 
procurement.47 Moreover, actions to create innovation-friendly procurement processes 
need to span the whole cycle, from defining and formulating the procurement need, to 
identifying and evaluating suppliers, and finally adopting and diffusing the resulting 
innovation.43 For example, rather than specifying the desired end solution or the route 
to developing a solution, procurement teams should specify the needs that have to be 
addressed to allow room for creative, unpredictable solutions. In order to achieve this, 
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procurement teams may need to rely on specialized intermediaries to support complex 
procurement activities. Such intermediaries can act as an innovation broker and can 
leverage digital technologies to better connect governments with a wider range of 
innovative suppliers, including startups.48 Next to involving specialized intermediaries, 
procurement teams could also engage end users at an early stage in order to give 
feedback to innovative suppliers and thereby ensuring wide adoption and diffusion of the 
solution.47 All of these actions could allow for more room for innovation, thereby opening 
more doors for startups to participate in the procurement process.
Governments can also experiment with new models of startup engagement. These could 
include startup in residence programmes, challenge-based programmes and accelerator 
programmes. Examples of each of these programmes already exist in some countries,49 
although they often remain peripheral to central government actions and their impact is not 
yet well evidenced.
In the Netherlands, the city of Amsterdam set up a Startup in Residence programme to 
find new solutions to the city’s challenges, modelled after a similar programme in the US. 
During the six-month programme, startups receive training and get access to government 
experts and networks. Similar challenge-based programmes – not specifically targeted at 
startups though – exist in Denmark (e.g. the Danish Govtech Challenge), the UK (e.g. CivTech 
Scotland) and Poland (e.g. GovTech Polska). The idea of these government programmes 
is that (startup) companies are invited to solve different problems in innovative ways. 
Challenge-based programmes are often set up as a type of ‘pre-commercial procurement’, 
where startups develop a prototype and governments have the option to procure it, if it fits. 
Some public bodies also run accelerators, often focused around specific verticals such as 
health (e.g. the NHS Innovation Accelerator in the UK), defence (e.g. the Innovation Defence 
Lab in France) and cyber (e.g. the Cyber Innovation Hub in Germany).
Many of these programmes are still in the early stages and more evidence is needed 
to further shape them and assess their long-term impact. A qualitative review of the 
Amsterdam Startup in Residence programme concluded that while the programme was 
helpful to instil a culture of innovation in the city departments, the resulting business 
opportunities for startups were limited and the policy may only be suitable for a specific 
scope of challenges that are not too simple, but also not too complex.44 An evaluation of 
the National Health Service (NHS) Innovation Accelerator also found significant innovation 
benefits for the public sector, but indicated that startups experienced difficulties in 
navigating the NHS’ commissioning and purchasing structures, which inhibited their ability 
to scale their innovations.50
In summary, a key challenge for government-startup collaboration programmes is to go 
beyond helping startups for a short period of time by translating the programmes into 
longer-term business opportunities that can help startups scale. Likewise, for governments 
to reap wider innovation benefits, the programmes need to be embedded within key 
government bodies and may require broader stakeholder involvement of multiple public 
and private actors. 
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